Connie Myers v. Albertsons, Inc. : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1995
Connie Myers v. Albertsons, Inc. : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joy Clegg; Snow, Christensen and Martineau; Attorney for Appellee.
James R. Hasenyager; Marquadt, Hasenyager, and Custen; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Connie Myers v. Albertsons, Inc., No. 950282 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6617
UTAH 
I) CUMENT 
KF'J 
45.9 
,S9 
OwCKETNO.H^22= 
UTAH SUPREME COU , r 
BRIEF 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CONNIE MYERS, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 950282 
ALBERTSONS, INC., Priority No. 15 
Defendant/Appellee, 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Appeal of the Judgment of Michael Glasmann 
Based upon a Jury Verdict 
Second Judicial District Court 
Weber County, State of Utah 
Joy L. Clegg 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
(801) 521-9000 
Attorneys for Appellee 
James R. Hasenyager 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
24 08 Van Buren Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
(801) 621-3662 
Attorneys for Appellant 
FILED 
OCT 2 3 1999 
APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CONNIE MYERS, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 950282 
ALBERTSONS, INC., Priority No. 15 
Defendant/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Appeal of the Judgment of Michael Glasmann 
Based upon a Jury Verdict 
Second Judicial District Court 
Weber County, State of Utah 
Joy L. Clegg 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
(801) 521-9000 
Attorneys for Appellee 
James R. Hasenyager 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
2408 Van Buren Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
(801) 621-3662 
Attorneys for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION i 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONS'T ITU II ON AI IR'TTSD'TIJ . . . 
STATEMENT ' ih nil'1 n'/V'IK . , , 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT'S . . . . . 7 
•- -VV-Vr'\TT , , , 
POINT I •• -
.NrirF DID NO I1 ADEQUATEl,V PRESERVE THE VOIR 
F ARGUMENT FOR REVIEW 
POINT il 
THE TRIAL COURT Mi" IT ""i" \ W V \ v I "1 IiiSCRET'P'W " 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR. IN DENYING PLAINT . :• I 
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT ! \ 
CONCLUSION . . , 19 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
CASES 
Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96 (Utah App. 1993) 11-13 
Barson v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.,682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984) . 8 
Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991) 11-13 
First Federal Savings & Loan v. Schamanek, 
684 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1994) 10 
Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988) 9 
Home Savings & Loan v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 
817 P.2d 341 (Utah App. 1991) 8 
Hunsaker v. State, 870 P.2d 893 (Utah 1993) 17 
Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp.,869 P.2d 926 (Utah 1993) . . . . 8 
Management Committee of Graystone Pine Homeowner's 
Association v. Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 
Utah 1982) 13 
Mel Hardman Productions, Inc. v. Robinson, 
604 P.2d 913 (Utah 1979) 14 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) 1 
RULES & REGULATIONS 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 42 1 
-ii-
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). The matter has been 
poured over to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 42, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
There are none. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff brought suit for a personal injury allegedly 
resulting from a courtesy clerk's bumping into the back of her 
ankle with an empty grocery cart. At the conclusion of a jury 
trial, the jury rendered a verdict of no cause of action and 
judgment was entered in favor of defendant and against plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff did not preserve her request for additional 
voir dire questions on the record in a timely fashion. The only 
reference at all in the record to voir dire requests or objec-
tions came after the jury had been selected, those not selected 
had been excused and the first witness had testified. At that 
point, the following exchange took place: 
THE COURT: Let's go on the record now and show 
that in this Myers vs. Albertsons case, we are in an in 
chambers conference. And Mr. Hasenyager wanted to make 
a report of an objection to some evidence that he 
thinks potentially would come in in the case. 
MR. HASENYAGER: Actually I had two things. 
Earlier when we were talking briefly about voir dire 
questions, I had proposed a little bit more extensive 
questioning under Evans vs. Doty. That was objected to 
by Joy because she thought you first needed to estab-
lish whether they had heard or read articles recently 
that may have had some impact. And that' s not my 
reading of Evans vs. Doty. 
MS. CLEGG: Could I clarify that so that's on the 
record? My objection was not that you had to show they 
had actually seen these publications, but that there 
was a likelihood they had been exposed, even if it was 
just in a doctor's office or something. And then you 
could ask them whether they had actually read it. 
Mr. Hasenyager: And the questions that I proposed 
to ask them were generally some general tort reform 
questions. In substance whether they felt that injury 
cases affected insurance rates. Whether they felt 
there ought to be a cap on damages on injury cases for 
certain types of injuries. And those kind of things. 
And we discussed it briefly. And your Honor felt that 
that was a little bit broader than what we should be 
asking them. But it is a subject that I feel we are 
entitled to go into. 
THE COURT: We will go back on the record again. 
Let me come back to the first comment you made, 
Mr. Hasenyager. The record should show that we did 
have that discussion without the benefit of a record 
being made concerning what questions might be asked on 
voir dire. That it was suggested by defense counsel 
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that a more general question be asked of the panel 
members concerning whether they would have any bias 
against someone who might bring this type of action for 
injuries sustained in a personal injury. And there was 
no response from any of the jurors that they had any 
bias in that area. And Mr. Hasenyager is correct, it 
was my ruling and my position that we should stay more 
general in nature in the questioning in this particular 
case. This is not a medical malpractice case, and it 
is the Court's position that the question that was 
asked adequately covered the area that needed to be 
delved into. But the Court does note your objection, 
Mr. Hasenyager. 
(Tr. 59-61; R. 197-99.) Plaintiff made no record at all of any 
voir dire request or objection before voir dire ended, the jury 
was passed for cause and testimony began. Even then, plaintiff 
did not make a record of what specific questions were desired. 
2. On October 18, 1990, Kim Jensen, a courtesy clerk for 
Albertsons on 40th and Washington in Ogden, Utah was returning 
several empty grocery carts to the store. He was stopped just 
outside the south entrance door waiting for customers to precede 
him into the store. Plaintiff was the last customer ahead of him 
entering the store. When he thought that plaintiff had advanced 
far enough ahead of him, he started slowly pushing the carts into 
the store. The next thing he knew, the plaintiff got angry at 
him and accused him of bumping into her with the lead cart he was 
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pushing. He did not realize he had bumped her until she got 
angry at him. (Tr. 230-33, R. 368-71.) 
3. The courtesy clerk, Kim Jensen, was mentally impaired 
due to brain tumor which retarded his development cis a child. 
(Tr. 239-40, R. 377-78.) 
4. Plaintiff waited three weeks before seeking treatment. 
(T. 153, R. 291.) 
5. Plaintiff's husband testified that her knee symptoms 
did not begin until six to eight months after the incident. 
(Tr. 146, R. 284.) 
6. The only injury that the plaintiff complained of to the 
store director, Craig Howard, was a bump to the back of her heel 
which left a red mark. (Tr. 242-43, R. 622-23.) The plaintiff 
declined Mr. Howard's offer of assistance and left the store. 
(Tr. 254, R. 392.) This lawsuit was Mr. Howard's first notice 
that the plaintiff was complaining of something other than a bump 
to her heel. (Tr. 256, R. 394.) 
7. Mr. Howard testified that if indeed the plaintiff was 
facing the entrance door and was walking between the railings 
into the store, there would be insufficient room between the 
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railings for a cart to come from behind the plaintiff and cross 
over the top of the plaintiff's foot. Instead, the cart would 
have hit the plaintiff on the back of the heel. (Tr. 257-58, R. 
395-96.) 
8. Dr. JoAnna Erzinger was the neurologist who treated the 
plaintiff. (Tr. 108, R. 246.) Dr. Erzinger diagnosed a 
peripheral neuropathy in both of plaintiff's feet which the 
doctor opined could not have been caused by a contusion to the 
dorsum (top) of the right foot. The doctor further opined that 
3 0-50% of peripheral neuropathy cases have no known cause. (Tr. 
110-112, R. 248-50.) While Dr. Erzinger stated that the 
plaintiff could have causalgia as a result of a contusion to the 
dorsum of the right foot, the doctor did not believe that was an 
accurate diagnosis since there was no trauma to the left foot and 
the plaintiff complained of the same symptoms in both feet with 
no differentiation between the two feet. (Tr. 114-19, R. 252.) 
9. Rickie Sheffield is the chief of Systems Management in 
the contracting directorate at Hill Air Force Base. He was 
plaintiff's direct supervisor from July or August of 1992 through 
August of 1994. (Tr. 199, R. 337.) Although Mr. Sheffield had 
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supervised the plaintiff for two years after the incident, he 
knew absolutely nothing about the incident or her alleged injury 
until November of 1993 when the plaintiff called him to let him 
know he was going to be deposed in this lawsuit. When he told 
the plaintiff he knew nothing about the incident or her alleged 
injury, she said she would give him a document the next week to 
refresh his recollection. That document is Exhibit No. 5 in the 
Record. (Tr. 201-2, R. 339-40.) Although the plaintiff gave him 
the document to refresh his recollection, he denies that the 
signature on the document was his and denies it is a form he has 
ever seen or a form that is used by Hill Air Force Base. He 
testified that his signature on the document which purports to 
outline plaintiff's employment and injury received in the 
incident is a forgery. (Tr. 202-23, R. 340-361.) The plaintiff 
claimed that the document had been typed on Mr. Sheffield's 
secretary's machine, however, Mr. Sheffield checked the type on 
that machine with the type on the form and found them to be 
different. (Tr. 207, R. 345.) He further testified that Connie 
Myers has a reputation for dishonesty: 
Q: Do you have an opinion as to Connie's reputation 
for truthfulness? 
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A: In my opinion Connie Myers is not very honest. I 
believe her to be a predator. . . . 
(Tr. 209-10, R. 347.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiff has failed to fulfill the obligation to provide an 
adequate record on appeal for reviewing the voir dire issue and 
this Court should not consider that claim. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion during voir 
dire because this was not a type of case, such as a medical 
malpractice case where there has been publicity concerning 
verdict amounts, the plaintiff did not submit proposed voir dire 
questions on the record nor any example of tort reform propaganda 
which plaintiff now alleges could have biased the jury. The 
plaintiff simply did not create a situation, such as was her 
burden to do, in which it would have been appropriate for the 
trial court to ask additional voir dire questions. 
The trial court did not err in denying plaintiff's motion 
for a directed verdict. There was ample evidence to support the 
jury's verdict in favor of the defendant. 
-7-
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF DID NOT ADEQUATELY PRESERVE THE 
VOIR DIRE ARGUMENT FOR REVIEW. 
The burden is always on the party objecting to make certain 
that the record adequately preserves an objection or argument for 
review in the event of an appeal. Barson v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, 
Inc., 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984) . An off-the-record discussion 
during which plaintiff requested additional voir dire is 
insufficient to preserve the issue for review. Plaintiff's 
failure to make a timely record of what questions she wanted and 
why she wanted them bars this Court's ability to even consider 
the issue on appeal. Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 
926 (Utah 1993). Plaintiff had ample opportunity to timely 
preserve voir dire objections on the record at the trial court. 
Plaintiff's failure to avail herself of that opportunity relieves 
this Court of any obligation to hear those objections on appeal. 
Home Savings & Loan v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 817 P.2d 341 
(Utah App. 1991). 
Here, the record is silent regarding voir dire requests or 
objections until voir dire was over, the jury selecbed and passed 
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for cause, nonselected jurors were excused and plaintiff had 
begun the presentation of evidence. It was not until after the 
plaintiff's first witness had testified that plaintiff's voir 
dire request was even mentioned on the record. Even then, the 
record only reveals a brief, general, paraphrasing by plaintiff's 
counsel of an earlier off-the-record discussion. This was far 
too little, far too late: 
MR. HASENYAGER: And the questions that I proposed to 
ask them were generally some general tort reform 
questions. In substance whether they felt that injury 
cases affected insurance rates. Whether they felt 
there ought to be a cap on damages on injury cases for 
certain types of injury. And those kinds of things. 
And we discussed it briefly. 
(Tr. 59-60, R. 197.) Even had the foregoing voir dire request 
been made on the record in a timely fashion before the jury was 
empaneled and the testimony began, it would be an insufficient 
record to determine whether or not the judge erred. Where there 
are no means of verifying what the proposed questions were, the 
appellate court usually will not consider a claim based on that 
alleged error. Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988) for 
the simple reason that the trial court was not given a fair 
opportunity to avoid an error. Plaintiff should have submitted 
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specific questions on the record to preserve the issue for 
appeal. Having failed to fulfill the obligation to succinctly 
advise the Court what she wanted and failing to provide an 
adequate record on appeal for reviewing the trial judge's ruling, 
appellant's first appeal issue must fail. First Federal Savings 
& Loan v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1994). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION. 
The court did not abuse its discretion by not asking tort 
reform questions. To say otherwise would mean that every per-
sonal injury case, not just high publicity, heavily lobbied 
matters such as medical malpractice cases, requires tort reform 
questioning during voir dire even when the plaintiff does not 
submit proposed questions on the record and even though the so-
called "tort reform media blitz" of the 1980s is ancient history. 
It is unreasonable to suggest that juries today are biased 
because of a short-lived media blitz during the 1980s in which 
the insurance industry and the American Medical Association 
publicized tort reform issues, particularly when this is not a 
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medical malpractice case nor the type of injury case likely to 
result in a significant damage award. 
The two cases relied upon by plaintiff are factually dis-
tinguishable from the case at hand. In both Evans v. Doty, 824 
P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991) and Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96 
(Utah App. 1993), the following scenario was present: 
1. They were both medical malpractice cases which was 
one of the big focus areas in tort reform publicity during the 
1980s because those cases often involve higher jury awards; 
2. In both cases, plaintiffs had submitted written 
motions with specific voir dire questions in writing and on the 
record in a timely fashion before voir dire began; 
3. In both cases, plaintiffs submitted specific 
examples of the tort reform "propaganda" in question: in Evans 
v. Doty, it was a March 24, 1986 issue of Time entitled "Sorry, 
your policy is canceled." Id. at 462. In Barrett v. Peterson, 
plaintiffs submitted widely distributed advertisements and 
articles setting forth insurance industry viewpoints on tort 
reform issues. One of those articles was the same as that used 
in the Evans case "Sorry, America, your insurance has been 
-11-
canceled," from Time. Other material included articles published 
by the Utah Medical Association which were aimed at the lay 
public and had been sent to doctors' offices for distribution in 
waiting areas. Id. at 97. 
This scenario was not present here. This is not a medical 
malpractice case. The plaintiff did not submit proposed voir 
dire questions on the record or a motion for voir dire and 
memorandum in support; the plaintiff did not submit any 
publication of any sort or even suggest that there had been 
recent publication of any tort reform advertisements or articles 
which the jury might have read or been exposed to, nor does 
plaintiff's brief suggest that any such publication has occurred 
since the mid-1980s. 
Furthermore, the holdings in Evans and Barrett were not as 
broad as plaintiff intimates. In Evans this Court affirmed the 
jury verdict of no cause of action holding that while it was 
error not to allow the proposed voir dire questions, it did not 
rise to the level of an abuse of discretion given the totality of 
the questioning during voir dire. Similarly, in Barrett, the 
court's holding was a narrow one limited to its facts: 
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We hold only that in cases such as this one [medical 
malpractice case with an excellent record of specific 
questions requested, motion and memorandum in support 
and specific articles of the alleged propaganda 
submitted to the court, much closer in time to the 
publication of the allegedly bias-forming materials] 
the plaintiff is entitled during voir dire to elicit 
information from prospective jurors as to whether they 
have read or heard information generally on medical 
negligence or tort reform, and to follow up with 
appropriate questions if affirmative responses are 
received. 
Id. at 104. 
No matter how plaintiff tries to align this case with 
Barrett and Evans, the fact remains that plaintiff simply did not 
create a situation, such as was her burden to do, in which it 
would have been appropriate for the trial court to ask additional 
voir dire questions. Judge Glasmann did not abuse his discretion 
in this case under the circumstances. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
Plaintiff correctly states that a motion for a directed 
verdict is only appropriate where reasonable minds would not 
differ on the facts to be determined from the evidence presented. 
Management Committee of Graystone Pines Homeowners Association v. 
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Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982). Plaintiff is 
also correct that all evidence on a motion for directed verdict 
should be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party. Mel Hardman Productions, Inc. v. Robinson, 604 P.2d 913 
(Utah 1979) . 
Having correctly stated the standard, however, the plain-
tiff's argument on this point references only those facts most 
favorable to the plaintiff. In order to correct this oversight, 
defendant recites the following facts which constitute the 
evidence viewed in the light most favoring the nonmoving party, 
the defendant, as the standard requires: 
1. Even though the plaintiff claimed that she was 
impaired at work and even had difficulty driving because of the 
injury to her right foot, her boss said that she had never had 
any trouble at work, had never requested that she receive help 
due to a physical impairment, and that he had not known she was 
even injured until she called him to advise his deposition was 
scheduled in November 1993. Mr. Sheffield testified that Exhibit 
5, a document given to him by the plaintiff in order to try to 
refresh his recollection of her injury and employment impairment, 
-14-
is a forgery. Finally, Mr. Sheffield testified that the 
plaintiff is a dishonest person and a "predator." 
2. The grocery clerk who was pushing the empty 
grocery carts and allegedly struck the plaintiff was mentally 
impaired due to a brain tumor which had retarded his development 
as a child; 
3. The grocery clerk simply "misjudged"1 the distance 
between the bottom leading edge of the first cart in the string 
of carts he was pushing and the plaintiff's ankle; 
4. The only injury the plaintiff complained of to the 
store director, Craig Howard, was a bump to the back of her 
ankle; 
5. Plaintiff waited three weeks to seek treatment 
and, even then, sought treatment for injury to a different 
portion of her foot, the top, than she had told the manager was 
injured in the incident; 
6. Although the plaintiff also claimed knee injuries, 
she did not complain of that at the time of her conversation with 
*Even the plaintiff's brief admits that the clerk merely 
"misjudged" the distance between the lead cart and the plaintiff. 
(Plaintiff's Brief, at 8 & 9.) 
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the store director nor at the time she first sought treatment 
three weeks after the incident. In fact, her husband testified 
that she did not complain about her knee until six to eight 
months following the incident; 
7. The plaintiff's only treating neurologist, 
Dr. Joanna Erzinger, testified that the symptoms for which she 
treated the plaintiff would not have been caused by a trauma to 
the right foot since the symptoms in both feet were identical and 
that for 30-50% of the patients with this diagnosis (peripheral 
neuropathy), there is no known cause for the diagnosis. 
Based on the foregoing evidence, the jury could easily have 
concluded that the mentally impaired grocery clerk was not 
negligent simply because he misjudged the distance between the 
front of the lead cart and the plaintiff's ankle. The jury could 
also have believed what the court suggested in denying the motion 
for directed verdict: 
There was the possibility that the jury in this case 
would view the evidence in the way Ms. Clegg has just 
described, that there was a bump to the back of the 
ankle and no injury. And from that, has concluded that 
there was no negligence to be assigned to the defendant 
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in this case. And so I am going to deny the motion on 
that basis. 
(Tr. 312-313, R. 450-51.) 
The plaintiff's argument is flawed by the assumption that 
because an accident occurred and because there was some physical 
injury, negligence must be presumed. That simply is not the law. 
In fact, MUJI 3.3 entitled FAULT/NEGLIGENCE NOT IMPLIED FROM 
INJURY ALONE states "The mere fact that an accident or injury 
occurred does not support a conclusion that the defendant or any 
other party was at fault or was negligent." 
A plaintiff must do more than simply show an accident 
resulted in injury. To prevail on a negligence claim, the 
plaintiff must establish that the defendant owed plaintiff a 
duty, defendant breached that duty, the breach of duty was a 
proximate cause of plaintiff's injury, and plaintiff in fact 
suffered injuries or damages. Hunsaker v. State, 870 P.2d 893 
(Utah 1993). 
In this case, the jury had ample evidence to find that one 
or more of the last three elements of the negligence claim were 
absent. The jury could have found that the mentally impaired 
clerk did not breach a duty simply because he misjudged the 
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distance between the lead cart and the plaintiff; the jury also 
could have found that the incident was not the proximate cause of 
plaintiff's injury since her own husband testified that the 
plaintiff did not complain about her knee for six to eight 
months, she certainly didn't complain about it on the day of the 
accident, and her own neurologist testified that the symptoms 
plaintiff was complaining of in both feet could not have been 
caused by a trauma to one of the feet; the jury also could have 
believed that the plaintiff did not, in fact, suffer any injuries 
or damages since the cart only bumped her in the back of the 
ankle. Life's road is full of bumps. 
Based on the foregoing law and the facts of this case, the 
jury simply concluded that even reasonable people misjudge dis-
tances and bump into one another and that it is not necessarily 
negligence to do so. Because there was ample evidence to support 
the jury verdict, the trial court did not err in denying 
plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict. 
-18-
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the defendant/appellee 
respectfully requests that the judgment of the trial court be 
affirmed. 
DATED this^A^ day of October, 1995. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
ABtotneys fo^ftppellee 
n \l563l\3l\brief.app 
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